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INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) reform, the government promoted export and foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows because of a shortage of foreign reserve. However, many companies in Europe and the United States (US) hesitated to invest in the PRC that time, though a few of them tried. At the beginning of investment promotion, most of the FDI inflows came from Hong Kong, China. At the same time, export promotion policies seemed not to work either, as the PRC maintained a trade deficit for many years after 1978.
A. Twin Surplus
Things changed after the 1980s, as more and more multinationals invested in the PRC. This trend accelerated in the 1990s. Before 1985, the progress of FDI inflow promotion seemed ineffective. Only $4.1 billion of FDI inflows to the PRC were recorded between 1979 and 1984, improving only after 1985. In 1992, FDI inflows reached a historical high of $11.0 billion and further accelerated after that. FDI inflows enlarged the PRC's export and trade surplus, a "twin surplus," that began in 1994.
Until now, twin surplus is still the best description for the PRC's external economic relationship. The monetary authority accumulated huge amounts of foreign reserve from the trade surplus and financial account surplus. In 2010, the PRC's foreign reserve stood at $2,847. 
B. Balance of FDI Item in Balance of Payment
The PRC's outward FDI is quite interesting in that the history of outward FDI seems longer than that of inward FDI. The PRC's outward FDI began in 1976 but remained at a very low level for a long time. The most common channel for the PRC's outward FDI is through joint ventures. Chinese companies invested $5.1 million in joint ventures between 1976 and 1981, which went to Hong Kong, China (81.4%); Macao, China (0.6%); Sudan (17.1%); and the US (0.8%). The PRC's investments focused on trade-related and resource industries.
However, the PRC's outward FDI did not develop smoothly because of two constraints. One is shortage of foreign reserve, as previously mentioned. The other is absence of strength and internationalization of Chinese companies until 2003.
As a result of the different performance of inward and outward FDIs, the PRC held an FDI surplus in its balance sheet for a long time. This is quite unlike other Asian countries like Japan, but consistent with the performance of a developing country. However, with the PRC's outward FDI growing dramatically, the FDI surplus is narrowing gradually. It is very possible that the PRC might hold a deficit in the FDI item in the near future ( Figure 2 ). 1999 1995 1994 1996 1998 1997 
II. INWARD FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
Under the PRC's open and reform strategy, the government published FDI promotion policies after 1978. In 1978, Panasonic and Coca Cola entered the PRC. Prior to that, foreign companies were retreating from the PRC, exemplified by Shell's withdrawal in 1966. Because of the open policies and market prospects, some enterprises from Hong Kong, China; Japan; and the US started investing. In 1990, FDI inflows to the PRC stood at $3.5 billion, most of which came from Hong Kong, China; Japan; and the US, which accounted for 54.9%, 14.4%, and 13.1%, respectively.
In the last 20 years, the PRC's FDI inflow has grown from $3.5 billion to $100.0 billion. Also, the sources, destination, structure, and even the target of the foreign-invested companies have changed dramatically.
A. Determinants and Motives
The theory on determinants and motives of inward and outward FDI is quite mature. Dunning and Lundan (2008) classified enterprises engaged in international production into four types. First is the natural resource seekers, a very broad classification that includes physical resources, cheap and well-motivated unskilled or semi-skilled labor, technological capability, management or marketing expertise, and organizational skills. Second is the market seeker, which often occurs in the country with huge amount of imports, and where international production can reduce tariffs and other types of trade barriers. Third is the strategic asset seekers, enterprises that invest abroad for certain strategic assets to enhance their future competitiveness. Besides the above three types of FDI, Dunning and Lundan (2008) also mentioned investments to escape restrictive legislation or macro-organizational policies, and investments aimed at supporting related enterprises.
Beside the traditional explanation for FDI, there are also new findings. More and more researches take the gravity equation from trade-related areas into investment-related research. Blonigen and Piger (2011) find the traditional gravity variables-cultural distance factor, parent country per capita gross domestic product, relative labor endowments, and regional trade agreements-are most likely to be the determinants of FDI activities. According to empirical data from the PRC, this explanation actually makes.
As far as the PRC is concerned, Zhang (1994) pointed out that deregulations and reforms make some provinces or cities more attractive for multinationals. The establishment of special economic zones is the best example. Head and Ries (1996) found that policies supporting the development of infrastructure and industry have positive effects on FDI inflows at the provincial level. Both of the researches prove that FDI-promoting policies are determinants of FDI inflows. Another is the difference between different investors. Fung, Lizaka, and Parker (2002) found investments from Hong Kong, China and Taipei,China are efficiency-seeking, affected most by infrastructure conditions and labor cost. While Japanese investments are market-and resource-seeking, they pay more attention to the labor quality. In the interesting work by Fetscherin, Voss, and Gugler (2010) , they gave a more dynamic summary for these researches.
Other important factors that affect FDI inflow is the financial constraint and competition at the provincial level. The provincial government wants huge amounts of investment in pursuit of high growth. But investment is hampered by fiscal expenditure and financial constraints.
Under this situation, FDI is one solution to local investment demand and is in fact encouraged by the central government.
Combining the works of Dunning and Lundan (2008) and Fetscherin, Voss, and Gugler (2010) , the determinants of the PRC's FDI inflow can be summed up in three stages: First, between 1978 and 2000, most of the enterprises the invested in the PRC were resource seekers or escape investment. The purpose of investing in the PRC is to take advantage of preferential policies, low labor cost, and lesser environment regulation. At this stage, FDI is mainly from Hong Kong, China; Macao, China; and Taipei,China. Recently, because of more environment regulations and higher labor costs, some investments of this kind moved from eastern PRC to the western PRC. More recently, between 2001 and 2007, market seekers and efficiency seekers came in. Because of FDI in the first stage, the PRC can invest more in infrastructure, and labor quality improved much also. These two factors entice investors to the PRC to use the PRC as their base use the PRC as their base in Asia. Also, the PRC's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) ensures the multinationals of a more open market. Besides these, there is also supporting investment through agglomeration. The typical investors in this stage are from Europe, Japan, and the US. Third, after the global financial crisis, more and more multinationals became resource seekers and strategic asset seekers as they discovered the PRC's advantage in aspects like excessive liquidity, skilled labor, and new technology. More foreign investors invested in the PRC, even established joint ventures outside of the PRC, to take advantage of this.
Though the last 33 years of the PRC's history can be divided into three stages, it is quite difficult and impossible to tell where we are. Current investors belong to all the three stages. However, we can discern them from location and source. Investors of the first stage come mainly from Hong Kong, China; Macao, China; and Taipei,China, and located in the western or middle part of the PRC. Investors after the PRC's accession to the WTO mainly belong to the world's top 500 multinationals, and located in the eastern PRC, especially the Yangtze River Delta or Bohai Economic Circle. Most of the third stage investors are investors in the second stage, too. The typical behavior of the third stage investors the establishment of joint ventures with the PRC's central state-owned enterprises (SOEs) locally or abroad.
B. Main Characteristics and New Trends
We have pointed out several characteristics and new developments of inward FDI and discussed the determinants and motives of the PRC's inward FDI. In the following section, we will discuss the sources of inward FDI from developing countries to the PRC as we analyze the distribution of industries and host subregion, ownership structure, and some new trends in ownership structure of foreign-invested enterprises. In the services sector, most of the FDI goes to real estate, leasing and business services, and wholesale and retail trades (Figure 3 ). Another important factor that caused more FDI go to the Western PRC is the Western PRC Development Strategy. Under this strategy, some preferential policies abandoned in the Eastern PRC are kept in the Western PRC.
At the beginning of the PRC's opening and reform, most of the foreign enterprises choose establishing joint venture with Chinese partners. This ownership structure is the rational choice to reduce investment risk and abide by regulations. After more than 30 years of reform, the political risk of investing in the PRC has decreased gradually. Because of this change, more and more multinationals choose the wholly controlled ownership structure. Between 1998 and 2009, the wholly controlled enterprises increased from 36.2% to 76.3% (Figure 4 ). There are two other factors that encourage multinationals to choose wholly owned enterprises. One is deregulation. For example, before, foreign car makers could not establish wholly owned enterprise in the PRC, they must invest through joint ventures with local car makers under the strategy of Market for Technology. In 2004, the newly published Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries cancelled this restriction, paving the way for foreign car makers to establish wholly owned enterprises in the PRC.
C. Inward FDI from Developing Countries or Regions
In 1995, 95.5% of FDI inflows to the PRC came from developed countries or regions. Among the developed countries and regions, the most important source is Asian countries and regions, especially Hong Kong, China. FDI from Hong Kong, China accounts for 53.4% of all FDI inflow. After that, the percentage of Asian countries decreases gradually, and that of other regions increased. FDI from Latin America increased fastest among all regions, due mainly to the Cayman Islands and Virgin Islands, which, because of their local tax policies, attract more and more small-and medium-size enterprises, including some Chinese companies. In 2009, FDI inflow from the Cayman Islands and Virgin Islands accounted for 15.4% of the PRC's total FDI inflow (Table 3) .
FDI inflow from developing countries is very small, accounting for only 2.9% in 1995. In 2009, the percentage nearly doubled but is still very low at 5.2%. For FDI from developing countries to the PRC, the most important region is Asia. This situation somehow verifies the possibility of using gravity equation in FDI research, as have tried by some scholars (Blonigen and Piger 2011) . See Table 3 . (Table 4) .
FDI from developing countries to the PRC are mostly to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Most invested industries are labor-intensive. Because of this, inward FDI is very sensitive to labor cost changes. In recent years, many enterprises from developing countries moved to Southeast Asia, the middle PRC, or the western part of the PRC. Investors from the south are often called migrant enterprises as they are "easy to move." The first recorded joint venture serving processing and marketing of export products is Japan's Jinglian Industrial Co., Ltd. This corporation is jointly invested in by Beijing International Trust Co., Ltd.; Asahi Trading Co., Ltd.; and Sanwa Bank. The biggest Chinese company to go abroad is CITIC Canada, which was established in 1985.
A. Determinants and Motives
The theoretical framework for inward FDI is suitable for outward FDI also. As the PRC is a developing country, there is some concern about the PRC being a "third world multinational." Dunning (1981 and 1986 ) put forward his investment development cycle theory to explain the phenomenon of third world multinationals, and supported it with more empirical analysis in 1986. According to his theory, countries with per capita gross national income (GNI) under $2,000 will have no outward FDI. One country will begin to have FDI outflow when per capita GNI enters the range of $2,000-$4,750. According to the investment development cycle, the PRC's outward FDI should begin from 2006 when its per capita GNI is $2,076. The outward FDI data does not seem to support this hypothesis, as the breakthrough of the PRC's outward FDI happened in 2003 ( Figure 5 ). 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 1264 2076 Other research find the PRC's outward FDI as two-way motivated (Kolstad and Wiig 2010) . Outward FDI going to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries is market-seeking, while those going to non-OECD countries seek a combination of large natural resources and poor institutions. This finding is very interesting, but there is no evidence from the operational level.
There are only a few literature on the determinants and motives of the PRC's outward FDI because it is only at the beginning stage. Hence, it is very difficult to draw any sound conclusions on this issue. What we can give are only observations. According to evidence at the operational level, the PRC's outward FDI can be divided into four types. First, with central stateowned enterprises (SOEs), which are resource seekers, high economic growth and low energy efficiency present a severe shortage of energy and resources. To guarantee the supply of raw materials, central SOEs seek physical natural resources from abroad. Second, with private companies, which are market seekers, Asia, Africa, and Latin America present target markets, specifically telecommunication, textile, shoe, and car industries. Some enterprises use domestic parts and assemble the final products in the local markets. Most of these enterprises are SMEs, but some big companies like Huawei and ZTE also belong to this category. Third, efficiency seekers such as air-conditioner manufacturer Green and machinery manufacturer Sany established production centers in Latin America to minimize transport costs, and use the local production center as regional base. Fourth, strategic asset seekers for example establish research or design centers in Europe, or acquire technology-intensive competitors through merger and acquisition, to enhance future competitiveness in domestic and global market. This type of investor includes Sany, Gily, Lenovo, Haier, etc.
B. Main Characteristics and New Trends
The 3 with total assets of $6,314 billion. Of these enterprises, 129 were central SOEs with total assets of $3,083 billion, accounting for 48.8% of the total assets and 27.5% of total profits (Table 5) . 2 There is a new policy in 2010, 0%-10% of their profit is collected as the revenue of the central government. Also known as "above-designated size enterprise", includes all stated-owned enterprises and enterprises with annual sale above CNY5 million. In terms of industry distribution, the basic structure of the PRC's outward FDI has been unchanged since 2005. The top three industries are leasing and business services, mining, and wholesale and retail trades. The investors of the first two industries are mostly central SOEs, while those in the third are mostly private companies (Table 6 ). 
C. Outward FDI to Developing Countries or Regions
Similar to inward FDI, most of the PRC's outward FDI go to developed countries, especially in Asia and Latin America. FDI outflows from the PRC to developed countries in these regions account for 82.6% of total outward FDI stock. FDI from Asia and Latin America goes to Hong Kong, China; Cayman Islands; and the Virgin Islands (Table 7) . However, the percentage of outward FDI to developing countries is higher than that of inward FDI. As of the end of 2009, $25.35 billion outward FDI in developing countries were made by Chinese investors, accounting for 10.3% of total outward FDI stock. Most of the investors choose Asian and African developing countries as destination (Table 7) .
Again, according to ADB classification, most of the FDI outflow goes to Asian developing countries. As of end-2009, about 73.77% of total outward FDI went to Asian developing countries. Of this 73.77%, $181.29 billion or 92.10% went to developing countries or regions in East Asia (Table 8 ). At the beginning of the PRC's openness and reform, most of the inward FDI came from overseas Chinese. This is why the percentage of Hong Kong, China in 1989 was as high as 61.2%. During that time, because the risk of investing in the PRC was still high, many multinationals chose Hong Kong, China as a base. a Eventually, more and more American and European multinationals invested in the PRC. The risk of investing in the PRC decreased as well. As a result, the percentage of Hong Kong, China decreased.
However, after 2005, percentage of Hong Kong, China rose again, the main reason being round-tripping investment. The ratio of round-tripping investment between the PRC and Hong Kong, China was previously 25%, i.e., 25% of inward FDI was originally done by investors from the PRC with domestic capital. Recently, the ratio is much higher, around 40%. During 2001 During -2009 , the correlation coefficient between inward FDI from Hong Kong, China and outward FDI to Hong Kong, China is 0.79 (Table 9. ). Besides round-tripping investment, Hong Kong, China also acted as a conduit for investments from the PRC to other countries and regions. Because of the effective protection system for investors, low taxes, and good human resources, some Chinese companies listed or set up headquarters in Hong Kong, China before investing in other regions and countries.
__________________ a This phenomenon happened in all industries before. However, most multinationals in the financial and nonfinancial sector moved their headquarters to Yangtze River Delta, Beijing, and Bohai Economic Circle.
The PRC's outward FDI is of a dual nature: central SOEs and private companies. The former is big in scale and strong in capital with more policy support, while the latter is small in scale and weak in capital without policy support. The PRC's outward FDI to developing countries are mainly of two types: for central SOEs, natural resources and energy; while for the private sector, mostly for future market share. Most of the private companies are invested in labor-intensive industries, with some exceptions. The PRC's private companies have done a good job in telecommunications, city bus making, and infrastructure construction in developing countries. Outward FDI to developing countries also seems to be affected by diplomatic policy. Most of outward FDI is carried out with the help of local embassies, so more companies invest in countries with good diplomatic relationships with the PRC and where the investment environment is more stable.
Before 2000, commercial banks in the PRC, especially those state-owned, were hobbled by nonperforming loans. Soon after, non-performing loans were decoupled from the commercial banks and managed by four asset management corporations. This action saved the commercial banks from market competition. The PRC's financial institutions invested overseas more and more after 2006. During 2006 and 2009, the stock of the PRC's overseas investment in the financial sector grew from $15.6 billion to $46.0 billion (Table 10 ). Three factors drove up the PRC's outward FDI in the financial sector. First, the demand from Go Abroad of the nonfinancial sector. More and more companies in the nonfinancial sector invested overseas and the commercial banks followed them. According data on M&A, this work began in 2007 (Box Figure 3) . Second, the establishment of China Investment Corporation (CIC). Even before its establishment, CIC had invested $3.0 billion in Blackstone (Box Figure 4) . Note: Sata here is inconsistent with Table 9 because of different source. Because of limit to data accession, the data here maybe incomplete.
Source: News release of financial institutions in PRC, summed by author. Note: data here is inconsistent with Table 9 because of different source. Because of limit to data accession, the data here maybe incomplete.
Source: News release of financial institutions in PRC, summed by author.
IV. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
The PRC has opened its doors to foreign investors for more than 30 years, so the impact of inward FDI on the economy is significant, impacting the economy in many aspects and at different levels. However, the effect of outward FDI is currently not so clear.
A. Inward FDI and Development
If current Chinese economy is an engine of world economic growth, the FDI must be the first bulk of fuel enabling its beginning rotation. Generally speaking, the impact of inward FDI happened at macroeconomic level, industrial level, and microeconomic level.
On the macroeconomic aspect, inward FDI impacted local GDP growth interms of gross investment and net export. We can calculate the contribution of inward FDI to the PRC's GDP according to the share of foreign-invested enterprises in domestic gross investment and net export. Our calculation shows that the average contribution of inward FDI to the PRC's GDP is between 3% and 6%. Inward FDI also increased domestic consumption indirectly through labor wages and other channels (Figure 7 ). In addition to its contribution to GDP, inward FDI also contributed to the PRC's tax revenue and industrial growth. In 2009, the share of foreign-invested enterprises in tax revenues was 21.58%. Foreign-invested enterprises also contributed 27.95% of industrial value added in 2009 (Table 11) . Foreign investors bring new products to the PRC market. This is the most useful information for Chinese enterprises at the beginning of reform and openness. Another contribution of inward FDI is technology spillover through imports, fairs, and inward FDI.
Because of the contribution of inward FDI, many industries developed in the PRC through spillover in industries including household appliances, food, and machinery manufacturing. The household appliance industry not only matured, but also acquired competitive edge at global market.
Foreign-invested enterprises enhanced the labor quality in the PRC and transformed labor from unskilled to skilled. This contribution can be regarded at the macroeconomic level as human capital investment, and labor skill improvement at the micro level.
However, though the contribution of inward FDI to export and export is apparent, the contribution of FDI to the PRC's employment is very limited, with only 5.46% of labor in urban areas working in foreign-invested enterprises. 4 This percentage is consistent with GDP contribution. We can imagine the relatively small contribution of foreign-invested enterprises to the PRC's employment because of higher productivity in these enterprises (Table 12) . What we should point out here is the statistical term maybe causes underestimation. Because the "urban workers" in the PRC's statistical term excluded the immigrant workers. So, the contribution of foreign-invested enterprises to the PRC's employment is quite possible to be much higher.
B. Outward FDI and Development
Though outward FDI grow fast in recent years, the flow and stock of the PRC's outward FDI is still relatively small. Hence, the impact of outward FDI cannot be clearly discerned.
The impact of outward FDI on domestic economic development seems more important. The PRC's economy has fallen into dynamic inefficiency for many years because of overinvestment and overcapacity. Outward FDI has alleviated this, and domestic macroeconomic efficiency has improved. Also, outward FDI in the energy and natural resources sector guaranteed a stable supply of energy and resources. This contributed to domestic industrial development.
The benefit of the PRC's outward FDI to host developing countries lies in capital supply and infrastructure. Some developing Asian countries are faced with a shortage of capital for development. For example, in the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) and Viet Nam, the investment rate is much higher than the savings rate, which means a local capital shortage. Inward FDI from the PRC partly met the demand (Figure 8 ). Also, the PRC's outward FDI help developing countries in building infrastructure. Chinese enterprises built roads and bridges in Southeast Asia. In India and other developing countries outside Asia, Huawei developed local telecommunication networks. According to the PRC's experience, infrastructure is one of the most important factors to attract FDI. The PRC's outward FDI helps some Southeast countries in their anti-drug campaign through opium-poppy control alternative development. Power Group and Hongyu Group from Yunnan province invested in Cambodia and the Lao PDR, developing alternative crops for planting in the farms. 
C. Dynamic Mechanism
For more than 30 years, the PRC has developed into an emerging economy from a typical developing country. During this process, the PRC benefited much from inward FDI. However, the most important experience from the PRC is how to become more attractive for FDI, and how to accelerate the process of FDI inflow. In this sense, FDI inflow to the PRC is a dynamic process. Among the determinants and motives of inward FDI, good institutions, good infrastructure, and high labor quality are key. First, the provincial governments, especially those of the Eastern PRC, improved the efficiency of approving FDI. According to the Doing Business Database of World Bank, the average procedures to establish an enterprise in the PRC is 14 days, costing 38 days (our survey shows 3-7 days). Second, improving infrastructure made the host country attractive for FDI. Local governments use tax revenue and land rental fees from foreign-invested enterprises to improve the infrastructure, including land development and road building. Third, the Chinese labor market proved to be very stable for foreign-invested enterprises. Immigrant workers improved their skill working for foreign-invested enterprises, becoming skilled labor.
Inward FDI is closely linked to outward FDI as mentioned earlier. Capital inflow and technology spillover from inward FDI make outward FDI possible, and enable Chinese enterprises gain competitiveness in the global market.
D.
Global Production Network FDI in the PRC followed that of a typical global production network. Companies imported parts and components from overseas and assembled it in the PRC, which then exported the final products overseas (Figure 9 ). Two factors characterize the PRC's typical global production network. First, preferential policies established export-oriented processing zones at the start of openness and reform. In these zones, enterprises can import parts and components without duty. This policy expanded to all special economic zones in the Southeast PRC. Second, low labor costs enabled the usage of labor that cannot be replaced by machines; this situation happened especially in the electronics, textile, and clothing industries.
The result of the PRC's typical global production network is a huge amount of imports and exports by foreign-invested companies. Though the employment of foreign-invested enterprises accounts for only 5% of all employment in the PRC, and the contribution to the PRC's GDP is only 3%-6%, the share of imports and exports is almost 55% (Table 13 ). This typical production network can explain why foreign-invested enterprises do not want to move to the middle PRC or the Western PRC where labor costs are much lower, but no ports can be found.
V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY ISSUES
The PRC has opened its doors to foreign investors for more than 30 years. More and more multinationals come to the PRC because of its market prospects, labor quality, and preferential policies. During this process, the PRC benefited from foreign-invested enterprises in terms of technology spillover, capital inflow, and economic growth, among others. Partly because of inward FDI, the PRC's outward FDI developed as well. Outward FDI benefited both the PRC and host countries. For the PRC, inward FDI and outward FDI comprise two types of dynamic mechanism, inward FDI, and one between inward and outward FDI.
The PRC experience reveals four policy implications. First, how can a dynamic process be started, especially one involving inward FDI? The answer is efficient institutions, good infrastructure, and stable supply of high-quality labor. Second, developing countries should open their doors to FDI. The benefits of inward FDI are obvious. Currently, the WTO's role in trade liberalization is stagnant, but the promotion of investment liberalization is quite necessary. Promotion of investment liberalization can be done at the bilateral level through bilateral investment treaties, or through a multilateral system consisting of regional development banks, the WTO, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Third, international coordination must be strengthened. We need the platform to solve investment disputes and coordinate environment regulations to achieve low carbon emissions. The current mechanism through diplomatic channels will not be efficient and sustainable in the future.
Finally, trade-related policies are necessary at the beginning of openness. The PRC established special economic zones, allowing foreign-invested enterprises to import parts and components without duty. This enabled the PRC to participate in global production networks. For foreign-invested enterprises with promise of operation for more than 5 years, the reinvested income will get 40% of tax rebate of corporate income tax. For enterprises in preferential industries and regions, the rebate rate will be 100%.
Summary of the PRC's Preferential Policies for Foreign-invested Enterprises
In effect 1 Jan. 1994 Land use fees policy making is up to local government, reduction varied in different region, usually with reduction from 10% to 50%.
In effect 1 Jan. 1994 For foreign-invested enterprises in export processing zone, or those in export processing business, free of import duty and value-added tax for imported components and parts.
In effect 22 March 2010 For R&D center of foreign-invested enterprises, the imported good for research use is free of import duty. For research-used purchase in the PRC, full rebate of ValueAdded Tax.
In effect a Disclaimer: this is an incomplete and unofficial summary of the PRC's preferential policies. It does not in any way necessarily imply consistency with currently valid regulation and legal system. Also, it does not in any way necessarily represent the opinion of the PRC government, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the Institute of World Economics and Politics, and the authors.
b The policies summarized here is for foreign-owned enterprises only, no matter specified or not.
c To receive the tax reduction, the foreign-invested enterprises must prove to operate in the PRC for the future 10 years.
